The Rules of the Game by Andrew Gordon (2d review)

What a book. Longass and deeply tedious at times, @ others it was Supreme. It was basically my last book of summer - and here is the first of October and im writing on it again. Again - there were times where I just had to soldier through it - or, rather sailor through - but the good shit? It's a fresh look @ the battle for me - ive read so much on it previously - but these are deeply good turns that have really really opened up new vistas on the battle in my mind. I've written on this before.

Two great things - the author is not only a great historian - he was also a sailor. So - his use of materials was just fucking masterful - quite typical of great historians .... well, because he is. Much of the official material on the battle - like every battle, basically, I've ever read about - never jibes. This battle in particular, because of its importance - and the importance of the participants reputations - particularly lends itself to competing views of participants. The battle - so looked forward to by both sides - turned out to be nitemares for all involved.

So - using charts, time lines, statements, radio logs, signal logs, biographies, and out and out logic - Gordon goes sussing out movements, exact times, the timing of the turns, which ship was firing on which ship (important), and other huge points. Although this battle was in 1916, its still being deciphered these days. And good. So, personal favourites of mine included the 5th Battle Squadrons near the end of the Run to the South. It's been written in all books - and the naval charts - that when Beattys battle cruisers turned north away from the upcoming main German battle fleet they put themselves on the engaged side of the 5th BS - they didnt duck behind their support ships to avoid german fire. But cobbled sources definitely put Beatty's harried battle cruisers on the disengaged side of the 5th BS. Another point is when the 5th BS actually did turn, the Malaya shortened its turn to avoid the concentration of German fire on the turning point of the ships that proceeded it. Beautiful. There's also good stuff about german targeting during the Run to the North. Also Beautiful. Amidttly, Although these are small points: I absolutely love how Gordon uses the information and logic to arrive @ truths about the battle. What an historian.

And then comes that nitemarish 250 midsection of the book - basically the point of the book, really. In no way is this a true complete history of the battle - its got lots of good overall stuff, but the battle is the lessor of the points. The main point was the battle over initiative in the Royal Navy. There had been a terrible collision in the Med in the late 1800's by two battleships in the RN. Huge scandel, especially since the orders that the admiral in one of the ships were obviously known to be decificient in one drill. The "bad" orders were followed lemminglike, which resulted in: collision and lots of death when HMS Victoria sank.

From this incident came the huge battle over initiative - some though that captains should have more freedom to move their ships, while others thought that orders should be followed 101% and dammed be y if y dont follow orders correctly. So, 250 pages of this 'diversion' in the book leaves us w. deep anticipation of 'getting back in' after 'it' - but also w. a deeper knowledge of 'initiave' and - write it - a deeper knowledge of Jutland. So, glorious knowledge flows thru my soul, sweat breaks the closer the 5th BS reaches south intot he jawa of the main german fleet - and the whywhywhy dont you turn North?is even more nerve wracking than when I first encountered it in 1984. What a book - even those rather dull 250 midsection pages. The whole "follow signals or move by self" argument highlites the rust that crept into the Royal Navy between 1815 and 1914. It ruled the world that period of human history(like the US Navy today, every other nation would have to gang up on it just to equal the dominant navies. Wait - the USN these days would have to be cut in half to equal the rest of the worls navies ... ), but it had its problems. It got rusty. A hundred years of peace had led it to lose its militarism and gotten rusty- a bad thing for a fighting force.

The 'initive' deal led to a long 'battle' between the two major English figures of the battle - who also were on opposite ends of the 'initive' battle. Jellicoe was in overall command of the english fleet - and was a proponent of signals. Beatty, 'dashing' commander of the 'dashing' battlecruiser fleet, was a nonsignals guy. So, looking back to the 5th BS and the Run to the South and Run to the North, the 5th BS was racing full on south following the battlecruisers and Beatty, all towards the main strength of the Germans. When the main German fleet was sighted, the battlcruisers turned around and away, but Beatty (who commanded all ships in this little detached fleet) really didnt signal to the following 5th BS to turn around as well. Since the 5th BS didnt get orders, they continued to careen towards the German main fleet w. no backup. Eventually, sense prevailed and the 5th BS did the 180 degree turn to the north - but the four ships were almost lost. Why didnt th 5th BS turn earlier? Evans -Thomas was an "orders guy" but Beatty thought that Eavns would turn and not wait for orders to do so.

And there was Beatty's refusal to signal to the main fleet what was going on. Beatty's main job was to scout for the main fleet under Jellicoe and bring elements of the enemies fleet to his mainfleet. This he did. But Jellicoe had little intel. from Beatty as to where the german fleet was, speed, direction, composition - beatty blew it big time. But Beatty actully did in other ways what he was supposed to do - bring the german fleet to the English main fleet. The whole initiave thing once again - althought Beatty didnt send clear signals to keep Jellicoe informed - he DID bring the German fleet to the doorstep of destruction @ the guns of Jellicoes fleet. Agin, its maddning to read and put yrself in Jellicoes shoes racing towards the Germans all the while waiting and expecting Beatty to actually report to him.

Close to 'orders' could be the Battle Fleet Instructions - a huge raft of instructions and "do this but not that" type of deals. Jellicoe wrote them all up (w. help) and followed them meticiously. Many felt that they had to be followed 101% or elae doom would fall onto the English fleet. When the Run to the North ended and the battle turned into the Main fleet Engagement phase, there came a point where the English basically had the Germans dead to rites - yet Jellicoe, nodding to the Battle Fleet Instructions, turned away from a feared German torpedo attack --- and away from the German fleet. Beatty felt that rite when the German fleet should be dealt w. totally, Jellicoe let them slip away only because of his too strict adherance to the 'rules of the game'.

Long after the battle came the battle after the battle betwixt Beatty and Jellicoe and their supporters. I will amidt that I was ever a Jellicoe man. Still am, i again amidt. But the very idea that Beatty actually did fight his ships south, located the main German fleet, and ran it north to dump the Germans in front of Jellicoe - this means much more to me these days. Beatty did that. But he also didnt signal - as well as being a deeply stuck up shithead.

Is that last sentance the real reason I'm a Jellicoe man rather than a Beatty man? Dunno.

Last idea - that 250p middle section was kinda hard to get through. But just magine my excotement when I got through it and debouched intot he valley of the last part of the battle. Glorious.